This paper examines determinants of schooling in traditional hierarchical societies with an established history of outmigration. In the village, a ruling caste controls local political and religious institutions. For children who do not belong to the ruling caste, migration is a strategy to increase social mobility, a process that is enhanced by formal schooling.
Introduction
While migration policies are being designed to trigger development in sending countries, there is a need to better understand the eects of these policies on educational outcomes. Most of the literature on the impact of migration on education focuses on the impact of parental migration on children's education. The question as to whether parental migration increases investment in schooling is still very much debated. Our paper takes a dierent view on the topic. We investigate how the expectation of future remittances from children living abroad inuences parental decisions about the education their children receive before migration. The paper is thus related to the "investment hypothesis" literature where the remittances of migrant children are repayments to their parents of implicit loans used to nance their education.
1 This raises the issue of the children incentives to repay the "loans" once abroad. The investment hypothesis literature glosses over this incentive problem by assuming a perfect coordination among the family members.
In sharp contrast with this approach, we show that the lack of enforcement mechanism to make children remit leads to strategic under-investment in schooling by some type of parents.
Our study takes place in a highly stratied rural community, in which religious, political and economic resources are controlled by a ruling elite caste, which represents about 40% of the village (male) elders. Based on data collected by one of the authors between
April and September 2004 in Matam, rural Senegal, the paper shows a negative impact of migration on the formal education of children from the ruling caste. Hence, we observe, for this caste, the opposite result of what is expected from the investment hypothesis literature: the children who are not sent to (formal) school remit more to their parents than those who have been sent to formal school. This result is explained by the fact that the parents have only imperfect instruments to control their migrant children while they are away. The ruling caste chooses to provide a religious education rather than a formal one to their future migrant children so that they can join the village ruling elite upon return if they decide to do so. 2 Indeed, if they stayed abroad in the modern economy, not 1 For more on this see Rapoport and Docquier (2006) which reviews the literature on motivations to remit and in particular the investment hypothesis.
2 Still, the cost of formal education is higher than the religious one (see section 2.2), which corroborates 2 only the absence of formal education would limit their economic opportunities, but they would also suer social stigma. Since their social status is higher at home than abroad, uneducated migrants from the ruling caste have strong incentives to return and hence to send substantial remittances while abroad. This eect, which does not hold for families of lower castes, highlights the negative eect of migration on educational outcomes.
The Millennium Development Goals aim at universal primary education for 2015, but in 2004, the primary education enrollment ratio was 76% for Senegal. 3 This gure hides great regional disparities mostly along the rural-urban divide. In the study region, primary school enrollment rate was still a low 60% in 2006 according to the Senegalese National Statistical Oce (source: Situation Economique et Sociale de la Région de Matam, 2007) .
This low enrollment is believed to be arising from the supply side, i.e., the quantity and quality of schools. Yet, the UNESCO (2007) claims that "the issue of universal access to primary education is currently being resolved in Senegal". Nonetheless, when schools are located at reasonable distance, as it is the case in the villages of our study, it is hard to argue that access is what prevents children from getting a formal education. But there are additional factors. Other explanations include the low perceived returns to education and the opportunity cost of child labor. Returns to education in traditional agricultural activities are low compared to returns in the urban modern sector. 4 As a consequence, if low returns in agriculture explain why investment in education is low, the prospect of migration should alleviate the problem. In urban centers, education has higher returns so that parents of prospective migrants should have the incentives to invest in their children's education. This is what the new literature on the so-called "benecial brain drain" or "brain gain" suggests. The central assumption of Mountford (1997) and Stark et al. (1997 Stark et al. ( , 1998 , who initiated this literature, is that the possibility of migration raises expected returns to education, which works as an ex-ante positive incentive to invest that the investment hypothesis theory does not hold here.
3 In 2008, the (gross) primary enrollment is 84% (source: Senegal at a Glance, World Bank, 2009).
However, these ratios are based on the number of students formally registered in primary school and therefore do not necessarily reect actual school attendance.
4 According to the ILO denition of child labor, a third of Senegalese children work. Montgomery and Hewett (2005) nd an urban advantage for children's primary schooling in Senegal and relate it to the absence of secondary schools in rural areas and therefore the limited motivation of parents to send their children to school (see also Amelewonou et al., 2003) .
3 in human capital of future migrants.
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The empirical evidence has not always found consistent support of a signicant eect of migration on investment in education. At the macro level, Beine et al. (2008) shows that in some countries having both low levels of human capital and low emigration rates of skilled workers favors brain gain. They instrument the endogenous "skilled migration rate" variable by the country's population size and migration stock. According to their study, Mali is shown to have a brain gain, which suggests that neighboring Senegal should probably experience a brain gain too as both countries share very similar socio-economic characteristics. Recent empirical microeconometric studies yield mixed ndings. In their respective studies in El Salvador, Phillipines and Mexico, Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003) , Yang (2008) and Alcaraz et al. (2012) nd that remittances favor schooling, using various econometric strategies to account for the endogeneity of remittances and schooling. In the Cape Verde study, Batista et al. (2012) nd that increasing the probability of own future migration increases the probability of completing secondary schooling. However, Kandel and Kao (2001) nd more balanced results in Mexico: children in migrant households have higher grades, but they have lower aspirations, i.e., they have less motivation to pursue beyond average years of schooling. Finally, both Antman (2011) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) nd negative eects of parental migration on children schooling in Mexico. According to Antman (2011) , the migration of the father reduces study hours in the short run. Similarly, McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) nd that family migration depresses school attendance and attainment. The negative results are explained by the illegal nature of the migration, which yields lower returns to education, and as a consequence lowers investment in human capital in migrant households. Hence, these results illustrate that migration prospects can also act as a deterrent to investments in education.
The literature on brain gain and on the investment hypothesis implicitly assume that family members are able to eciently bargain among themselves, or that parents, who are responsible for educational choices, are benevolent (unitary model of the household).
According to this logic, school attendance should increase if education leads to higher returns to migration. However, our analysis reveals that moral hazard problems and incentive issues within the household can lead to strategic under-investment by some parents. To instill obedience and family values, and thus a high level of remittances, the ruling caste chooses to educate less their future migrant children than their non migrant siblings by sending them to a religious rather than a formal school. By contrast, parents from lower castes choose formal education for their future migrant children. Since the latter have less incentives to return if they migrate, it is pointless to prevent them from getting a formal education.
Previously, the social status of the family within the village has been identied as an important determinant of migration and remittance behaviors. 6 In a study conducted in Kayes, Mali (a neighboring region of Matam, Senegal, where our data come from), Azam and Gubert (2005) found that migration is a strategy to "insure the family pride" because remittances prevent high-caste families not to fall below some income threshold that would keep them from maintaining their high rank in the village. In the case of India, Luke and Munshi (2011) also nd that the caste system is a signicant determinant of mobility:
women from historically disadvantaged castes are more likely than women from any other caste to have their children residing outside the ancestral community. Our concern is also with how social status and caste rank inuence parental educational choices for their prospective migrant children. By studying educational choice in the context of a socially stratied society, our paper is close to Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) , who examine the impact of caste on schooling choices. They nd that lower-caste girls are more likely to favor English school over local language school, thus "taking advantage of the opportunities that became available in the new economy". In this paper, we nd very similar behavior for the lower caste sons, who are more likely to be sent to a formal school than sons from the ruling elite.
To guide the analysis, we model the educational choice made by self-interested parents with dierent social statuses. Our specication of preferences has the property that status 6 As dened by Weber (1922) , social status is an eective claim to social esteem in terms of negative or positive privileges. He argues that a status ranking is not directly related to wealth or income though it may be aected by them. This is especially true in traditional societies where social stratication is based on position in a caste system (e.g. the Indian or African caste systems).
and income are complements: as sociologists would put it, agents exhibit a taste for status congruence (see Renault, 2002, 2008) . This property implies that the marginal utility of income increases with social status. Parents have the choice between sending their children to formal schools or not. The returns to education depend on whether or not children will migrate (i.e, internationally or internally). 7 The returns to formal schooling, where children learn how to read and count, are higher if the child migrates. We derive various predictions from our model that we test on data from the Matam region. The case study has particular policy relevance since it combines a high emigration rate with a feudal caste system and a low primary school enrollment.
If ruling class parents consider sending their children abroad, they choose not to send them to a formal school (they rather choose Koranic school), while parents from the lower castes choose formal schooling. This result comes from the fact that self-interested children send substantial remittances to their parents only when they plan to return home.
If the children decide not to return, then they have no incentive to send money to their relatives. They only send a minimum out of altruism and/or guilt. Parents from the ruling caste purposefully do not choose formal education for their future migrant children so as to maximize the dierential in status levels (i.e., marginal utility of income) between home and destination. This strategy is a key instrument to ensure the loyalty of their children that they combine with the "strategic bequest motive". 8 In host areas, the adult children generally occupy low-wage low-status jobs. The substantial remittances they manage to send home are partly invested in physical capital by their parents. When the migrants return home, they enjoy their elevated social status together with the resources derived from the accumulated family physical capital. By contrast, children from low castes have less incentive to return home. Migration becomes their only way out of the rigid hierarchical caste system that prevails in the village. When children from the low caste leave, it is thus often permanently. Their parents have less incentive to prevent them 7 In our sample, over a third of migrants remained in Senegal, mainly in the capital city of Dakar.
8 This classical motive was rst invoked by Bernheim et al. (1985) . As children compete for parents' inheritance, parents can threaten their children not to bequest them anything if they had not being supportive. Accordingly, young children remit to secure their bequest. In Botswana, Lucas and Stark (1985) found that wealthier families in terms of cattle ownership receive more remittances. Hoddinott (1992) Three main agriculture types coexist: rain-fed, ood-fed and irrigated crops. The villages are unequally endowed with dierent land qualities: irrigated lands are exclusively found next to the river banks, whereas ood-fed agriculture is practiced in backwaters as well.
The natural annual river ood have allowed farmers with plots in the lowlands to reap an additional harvest during the dry season. The control over those fertile lands gave the economic power to the local aristocracy.
Similar to other Sahelian societies, the Haalpulaar society is highly stratied. Statutory groups inherited from former African empires still strongly determine the social status of a family in the village society. 10 These groups are initially based on the division of labor and responsibility between "nobles", artisans and slaves.
The nobles, also referred to as "free men", represent a rather heterogeneous group: mixing both political leaders and commoners. At the top of the hierarchy are the "Torrobe" who are the religious leaders, along with some "Fulbe", traditionally cattle breeders.
Usually of lesser prestige than former sub-categories are the shermen, "Subalbe" and the warriors, "Sebe". It is usually the case that not all sub-categories can be found in each village, and usually one category dominates. 11 The most prestigious category, the "Tor- The artisans, "Nyenbe" are referred to as the "les castés" in French as this group matches best the idea of caste with job specialization (along with the usual endogamous feature it shares with the other categories). All the traditional crafts are represented from 10 According to Tamari (1991) , this organization originates from the Mali Empire in the 13th century.
The region known as "Tekrur" in the 10th century, was rst annexed by the Ghana Empire and then by the Mali Empire from the 13th until the 16th century.
11 In reality there exists many other subgroups. For a complete description of the Haalpulaar organization see Wane (1969) . 8 the blacksmith "Waylibe" to the leather workers "Sakebe" and the wood workers "Laobe".
Along with the craftsmen are the bards, "Griots" in French, "Aolube" in Pulaar. Today, artisan families do not necessarily practice in their traditional specialized activity but they usually still have been transmitting the know-how of their job. They cannot have access to the local political power.
At the bottom end of the pyramid, are the former slaves "Maccube", rather called "captives". In fact, at times of wars and "jihads", prisoners ended up as slaves. As a result, many family names of slaves are of other ethnic group origins, and as a consequence stigmatized, although many slaves took the name of their master. During almost seven centuries, it was common to change status due to wars: slaves would be turned into free men (nobles) to become warriors and noble prisoners would be enslaved. Ironically, the ocial abolition of the former caste system in 1848 put an end to this specic mobility, thus becoming rigid social barriers.
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As a result, although it was legally banned more than a century ago, slave status has evolved slowly.
Today in Haalpulaar society, social recognition is based on one's lineage and the prestige of one's lineage is assessed with regard to one's statutory group. N'Gaide (2003) explains that when two Haalpulaaren meet they ask each other their family names and try to trace back the patrilineal branch of the family tree to identify who they are talking to, in order to pay deserved tribute according to the ancestors' prestige. Descendants of slaves are expected to be deferential to nobles, to cook on festive occasions and sometimes repair their houses. 13 They distinguish themselves by their willingness to work hard (see Klein, 2005 ). An illustration of their position in the society can be found in "joking relationships". Depending on one's family name, one is allowed to tease people from another clan (one's "joking kin") without oending anybody. Usually, the jokes are very humiliating and are centered on either greed for food or calling the other "my slave". Similarly, some body and verbal languages are directly linked with low caste. For instance, nobles would rather not use insults in order to avoid being mistakenly taken for an artisan or slave (e.g., again, see Klein, 2005 Probably the greatest stigmatization in a gerontocratic village society is being a patriarch but not having a say outside the family circle. Local dignitaries descending from lineages of village founders and other prestigious families, referred to in the sequel of the paper as the "ruling caste", make up only a fraction within the "free men" category, the rest, referred to in the sequel of the paper as "low caste", being, along with the majority of the artisans and slaves excluded from the village political life. 
Schooling choices in the Matam region
In the six villages surveyed, each village possesses a formal primary school at the time of the survey. The most recent primary school opened 6 years before the survey. So that school attendance should not be subject to access constraints for the youngest cohorts, but probably comes into play for older ones. Figure 1 displays the percentage of all men and women living in the villages (7 years and older) who have ever attended formal school, by age groups. As expected for both men and women, the graph is decreasing showing that formal schooling is a recent phenomena. More interestingly, although access to formal primary school is not an issue for the youngest cohorts, only 51% of the 7 to 17 year-old children are enrolled, which was the national level 10 years ago. It is also striking that 35% of households do not send any children to formal school at all. Despite the presence of a school nearby, in our sample, the primary enrollment rate is very low for school age children living in the villages. Apart from the low perceived returns to education in rural areas, André and Demonsant (2009) (1993) and Becker (1996) , parents try to instill a feeling of guilt if children are not loyal to them. Hence, investing in religious and traditional educations, which inculcate family values, could be instrumental to shape a son's loyalty before sending him abroad. Migration is also an exit strategy for the low-caste people. As the village society is characterized by strong social rigidities, migration is a way out of the discrimination trap.
In West Africa, there are several historical accounts of the migration of slaves, who chose to migrate to urban centers or abroad to escape the social condition in their village. Klein 
The model
We consider education and migration decisions in a hierarchical society. We denote by e the educational choice of the parents: e = 1 corresponds to formal schooling while e = 0 corresponds to no formal education.
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In the village economy, status allocation is embedded into an exogenous and rigid system of castes ascribed at birth. Individuals are born into the high caste (i.e., the ruling caste), denoted h, or the low caste (i.e., the non ruling caste, mostly commoners, slaves and artisans), denoted l so that their status ordering is s h > s l . By contrast, in modern economies, social status is related to economic success and material well-being and stems mostly from relative income or wealth (see Veblen, 1899) . When the child migrates, denoted m, his status abroad depends on the level of formal education level (either directly as illiterate people are suering from social stigma, or indirectly through income eect) but it does not depend anymore on his birth: s mi (e) = s m (e) ∀i ∈ {l, h} so that s m (1) > s m (0). One important assumption for our results is the relative ordering of social status at destination and at home. Social mobility is more uid in a modern economy than in a traditional caste system. This translates into s l < s m (1): the status of a low caste is lower than the status of an educated worker in a modern economy.
Similarly, a member of the ruling elite has higher prestige in his community than an illiterate migrant worker in a modern economy:
The following assumption summarizes the social status ordering between the village and the migration destination.
Since in general there is no obvious ranking between the social status of an uneducated worker in a modern economy, s m (0), and the status of a low caste in the hierarchical society, s l , nor between the social status of an educated worker in a modern economy, s m (1), and the status of a high caste in the hierarchical society, s h , we do not make any specic assumptions about these relative orderings.
Abroad, wages depend on the formal education level, w m (e), while at home they are independent of education, w, capturing the low return of formal education in traditional agricultural economy. Consistently with empirical evidence we assume that
Following Auriol and Renault (2008), we dene the instantaneous utility of agent i as:
where w i is the income and s i the social status of the agent i ∈ {h, l} at the time of consumption. This specication of preference reects in a simple manner the agents' taste for consumption and status. Since income and status are both positively valued, indierence curves relating these two variables are strictly decreasing, reecting substitution between the two. However, they are not a perfect substitute: a prestigious status does not com-pensate for the absence of income; nor does a good income make up for an humiliating status. Indeed, convexity of preferences implies some complementarity between social status and income.
Individuals live for three periods: childhood, adulthood and old age. We set, without any loss of generality, the agents' discount factor, which is supposed to be equal to the growth rate of the economy, which is also the interest rate of the agents' savings abroad, to 1.
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Children and old people are unproductive. Education occurs in the rst period, work (either at home or abroad) in the second period, and retirement in the third period.
Since social security and formal retirement plans are sparse in the Matam region, parents rely mainly on the nancial support of their children, especially their migrant ones, during old age. We denote by r the share of income a migrant children send to his family. It is a social obligation to support aging relatives, so that there is a minimum share of his income, denoted r > 0, that a migrant child will send (out of altruism or guilt) to support his old parents.
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We focus on future migrant children. There are sequential choices for each type of agent i ∈ {l, h}. In chronological order, the parents move rst and the child moves next:
The parent i chooses 1) to send the child to a formal school or not, e i ∈ {1, 0}, 2) to invest a share of income in durable α i ∈ [0, 1]. The migrant child i decides 1) to remit, Finally, we assume that individuals, who are self-interested, are expected utility maximizers. Parents will send a child to a formal school if and only if the expected benet for them is higher than if the child is illiterate. Similarly, a child will remit and return home if and only if his expected utility is higher than when he does not remit. We rst examine the migrant's incentive to remit.
21 Choosing δ = 1 will not change the results of the paper (computation available upon request). The important assumption is that δ is equal to the interest rate of the agents' savings abroad. This assumption means that individuals can smooth consumption across periods if they do not return. It avoids introducing a bias against or in favor of saving.
22 If on average the minimum level of remittances is low, as it is the case in our database, some parents will have interest in perpetuating the caste system and will want their children to return home. If the average minimum remittance is large then it is always optimal to permanently send formally educated children abroad and to live on the minimum they send. 15
Remittances and Return
If the migrant plans to return, he will remit. Otherwise, he will not be welcomed home upon return. The remitting and return decisions are hence joined. If the migrant remits, the parents invest a share α ∈ [0, 1] of the remittances in productive assets (e.g., cattle) and durable (e.g., house) so that it is a form of saving. The reminder is used for their current household consumption. The stock of the parents' savings is non-liquid.
Customary rights to exploit fertile lands and inherited houses in the village cannot be sold. Therefore, the migrant will enjoy them only if he returns home.
Assuming he plans to return, if he remits r a migrant from type i = h, l will consume w m (e)(1 − r) in the rst period and rαw m (e) in the second period. His social status will be s m (e) in the rst period and s i in the second. Let α i (e) denotes the saving rate of parents i = h, l for their child with education e = 0, 1. The child inter-temporal utility is:
The next result unfolds.
Lemma 1. Individuals from caste i = l, h with education e = 0, 1 remit the maximum and return home if the saving rate of their parents is higher than the threshold
Otherwise, they never come back and remit the minimum r.
Proof: See the appendix 7.1.
The all-or-nothing structure of the results of Lemma 1 comes from the convexity of individuals' preference over status and income. At rst glance, this is surprising because convex preferences usually lead to balanced, interior solutions. However, the income/status complementarity implies that individuals' marginal utility of income increases with social status. All else being equal, a migrant would rather consume in the state of nature where his social status is highest. Since formally educated low castes have a higher social status abroad than at home, they would rather enjoy their consumption while abroad. 23 This is dierent for children from the ruling caste, who never attended formal school; they have 23 In particular if s l < s m (1)(1 − r) there is no saving rate that will compel them to remit.
16 a higher status at home than abroad.
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For these uneducated migrants from the ruling caste, the decision to remit depends on the saving strategy of the parents. On the one hand, if their bequest is large enough they will return home to enjoy their retirement savings like the ruling caste. Following Bernheim et al. (1985) , we will refer to this effect as "the strategic bequest motive". On the other hand, if their parents do not save enough, the uneducated migrants from the ruling caste would rather sever family ties and never return home in order to enjoy larger consumption levels. Finally, whether or not uneducated migrants from the low caste or formally educated migrants from the high caste remit large amounts hinges on the dierential between their status at home and at destination.
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Since s h > s l by assumption A1, Lemma 1 implies that the saving rate of low caste parents must be higher than the saving rate of the high caste parents if they wish to compel their children to remit large amounts:
s h . They are indeed obliged to compensate by a large bequest the humiliating status that their children will suer if they return home. More interestingly, independently of their caste origin i = l, h, parents of formally educated children must save more than parents of children without such education:
It is indeed harder to compel formally educated children to remit large amounts as their social status in the modern economy is higher than the social status of uneducated migrant workers. Formally educated migrant sons might thus consider to stay permanently abroad to enjoy higher levels of consumption. To avoid losing them in this way, their parents need to save more than parents of children who did not receive a formal education. As a result, the parents might enjoy lower consumption levels. To be more specic, let r i (e) be the share of the remittances that the parents can use for their consumption when they want to compel their migrant son to remit and return:
24 For the high caste children with education e = 0 the necessary condition to make them remit is ≥ 1 − r so that there is no saving rate that will compel them to return home.
It is straightforward to check that r l (e) < r h (e) and that r i (1) < r i (0). Combining Lemma 1 with the optimal saving strategy of the parents, which depends on the value of r i (e) compared to r, we establish a rst result about the behavior of the migrant children. (0)). Since we observe family social status, migrants' education and remittance in our dataset, we will be able to assess the relevance of these predictions.
Migration and Education
In our database, there are on average 1.5 migrant sons per household, and both lowcaste and high-caste parents send their children abroad. In practice, the average returns to migration are suciently large to cover the cost of migration and the opportunity cost of local revenue loss. 26 We thus focus on education choices made by parents who plan to send at least one of their children abroad.
The decision to send a child to school is made by the parents. If the child does not migrate, the parents do not have any incentive to prevent him from getting a formal education, provided there is a school nearby. The education decision becomes crucial to the family future earnings only when parents plan to have a child migrate. The next result provides the condition under which sending a future migrant child to a formal school is an equilibrium. 
18
Proof: See the appendix 7.4
We have already established in Proposition 1 that those who will have the strongest incentives to remit are the uneducated children from the ruling caste. This suggests that, everything else being equal, parents from the high caste will send their future migrant children to a formal school less often than parents from the low caste. The next corollary formally establishes this result.
Proof: See the appendix 7.5
The conditions in Corollary 1 are not too demanding. Basically, they require that
is not too low compared to s l .
27
It depends of the cultural context under study. In the Matam region, the uneducated migrants are typically employed as cooks in restaurants.
This occupation might not be the most prestigious one, yet it is not degrading. This is in River valley for the oensive treatment they receive because they are repeatedly reminded of their low-status position in the village. In fact, historical accounts of the migration of "slaves", conrm the low status associated with the low caste in Senegal, even to the point where ghting in a war is a better option than staying and enduring humiliations linked with such social status (see Klein, 2005 , and the history of the "Tirailleurs Sénégalais").
Corollary 1 establishes that parents from the low castes are more likely to send their future migrant child to a formal school than parents from the ruling caste. 28 For the ruling caste, the decision to send a child to the formal school is costly: it reduces the child's incentive to return home, and thus his incentive to remit. He might as well develop his own savings plan and enjoy it at his migration destination. By contrast, the child will always come back if he has no formal education and his bequest is large enough. In this In what follows, we assess the relevance of the theory by confronting its main predictions with our data from the Matam region in Senegal.
The data and descriptive statistics
The data come from a survey conducted by one of the authors in six villages around Table 1 proles the patriarchs by social status. As explained earlier in section 2.1, the Haalpulaar caste system is rather complex, however, the real prestige lies in the hand of the families who have exclusively access to political power: the ruling caste. Hence, for the purpose of the analysis it is sucient to divide the sample in two status groups: the "high caste" or "ruling caste" and the rest, hence labeled "low caste".
In Table 1 , it is striking to see that the ruling caste has signicantly more migrant sons and they have themselves been signicantly longer abroad (at the 10% level). Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that only patriarchs who have returned are taken into account here. According to the theory there could be a selection bias, as the migrant patriarchs from the low caste might have chosen not to return to avoid their local social stigma. This would explain the dierence between the two groups. Indeed, 64% of the ruling caste patriarchs have migrated and returned while only 49% of the low caste did, Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Two-group mean-comparison t-test statistics are reported last column (* signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%). To measure the "initial wealth" an index based on the wealth inherited by the patriarch, including cattle and land received as inheritance along with the number of spouses of the patriarch's father. As expected, the ruling elite caste has a much higher inherited wealth index compared to non ruling castes, and the dierence is signicant at the 1% level. These dierences are supported in the larger literature which also nds that the best and most productive lands are controlled by the ruling elite (Schmitz, 1994) .
In line with what is expected from the status of the ruling caste, they are signicantly older, more likely to be born in the village, and studied Koranic schools longer than those not in the ruling caste. It is important here to remember that all sampled patriarchs were on average born in the 30's, when there was no formal primary schools in the region and therefore no alternative to Koranic studies. Only 28 out of 149 (19%) reported they did not attend Koranic schools at all.
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In this paper, we will focus on the patriarch's adult sons (i.e., above 17 years old), which number 470. This sample is not representative as they are descendants of patriarchs over 65 years old who are still alive. Yet, they are representative of the sons of elders who are key actors in gerontocratic village societies. Most had nished their schooling at the time of the survey (only 24 were still studying in the formal system and 16 in Koranic schools). Table 2 displays their prole according to their status in the village and whether they were living in the village or abroad at the time of the survey: 45% of all adult sons were abroad (or in a Senegalese urban center). The fourth and the last columns show tstatistics of mean dierence tests between the ruling caste and the low caste, and between non migrants and migrants, respectively.
The overall formal educational level is very low: 2.4 years of formal schooling on average for all adult sons. In the initial sample including both migrants and non migrants, there is no signicant dierence between the two castes with respect to formal schooling.
What is striking, however, is the nding that migrants are signicantly less likely (at the 10% level) to have been to a formal school than the non-migrants.
Turning to the sub-sample of migrant sons, Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Two-group mean-comparison t-test statistics are reported last columns (* signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%). Since migration destinations may be quite dierent in terms of returns to formal education, we would ideally like to study each migration destination separately. Educational levels at each destination are provided Table 8 in the appendix 7.6. These descriptive statistics conrm that the ruling caste and the low caste sons have distinct education proles at each destination. For both castes, the ones who left the African continent have a much higher education level than non migrants. More strikingly, while non migrants from the ruling caste have a marginally higher education level than the low-caste ones, the education level of the low caste migrants is on average higher than the ruling caste for any destinations, while the dierence is not always statistically signicant due to the small sub-sample sizes.
The results of table 8, along with the fact that the ruling caste is more likely to remit while remitters have a lower educational attainment than non-remitters, are in line with Lemma 1 and Proposition 2. We now turn to the econometric analysis to check their robustness. This empirical section does not constitute a formal test of the model developed in section 3 but rather shows consistent results with our theory. Moreover, despite the good t of our regressions, the estimates below are still very much preliminary, given in particular, the small sample size. Conclusions from this study need to be qualied by this provision.
The Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis relies on the sample of the patriarchs' adult sons. We will focus on education, migration and remittance decisions, since we observe all of those in our database. Unfortunately, although we can observe the eects of accumulated capital, we are unable to assess the eects of savings or investments in durables as we lack complete data and in particular the timing of the savings and of the investment made.
We start with the two predictions of Proposition 1 regarding remittance decision:
children of lower castes remit less than children of the ruling caste, and children with 31 Among the subset of those who remit, however, the amounts remitted are not statistically dierent between the low caste and the ruling caste.
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formal education remit less than children without any formal education.
Results on remitting decision
In this section, we focus on the subset of adult sons who had migrated at the time of the survey. We rst examine which groups are more likely to remit. Results of the probit model are displayed column (1) in Table 4 . We are specically interested in whether sons from the ruling caste are ceteris paribus more likely to remit than sons from lower castes, and whether sons without formal education are more likely to remit than those with formal education. We also study the amount of remittances using Tobit model to account for the fact that 38% of migrant sons do not remit at all to their father. Tobit estimation results about the (log of) amounts remitted per year are displayed in column (2) in Table 4 . For both the probability of remitting and the amount remitted, we nd similar and consistent results. The son's age is not signicant. The fact that the age of the patriarch has a signicant positive eect for both the probit and the Tobit models, could reect the greater needs of older patriarchs (e.g., in terms of health expenditure increasing with age).
The longer the son has been abroad, the higher the probability of remitting and the higher amounts sent to the patriarch. This shows how important time in area of destination is to securing employment and higher earnings. Migrants who succeeded in leaving the African continent (mainly to France) have also access to better jobs that are usually better paid increasing both the probability to regularly remit and the amounts remitted. Having children living in patriarch's home increases the probability of remitting and the amount remitted. This illustrates somehow what Cox (1987) calls "the exchange motive": remittances depend on the amount and cost of services provided to the migrant by those who stay behind. The primary service provided to the migrant is the care giving to the child left behind. It might also reect an implicit "hostage" strategy, where the patriarch keeps the migrant's children to ensure that he will have incentives to return and to remit.
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The fact that the patriarch possesses land signicantly increases both the probability of remitting and the amounts remitted. This eect reects "the strategic bequest motive" illuminated in the theory: it is easier to make sons remit when there are illiquid assets (such as land) to inherit upon return. Migrants remit so that they can later claim their share of the inheritance. This result is identical to what Hoddinott (1992) found in rural Western Kenya.
The main results of these regressions regarding our model's predictions, are rst, that sons from the ruling caste are both more likely to remit and remit higher amounts, and second, and perhaps more interestingly, the impact of schooling. It is found to be signicantly negative on both the probability to remit and the amount sent. Although counter-intuitive at rst sight, this result is consistent with the result of Proposition 1
and Lemma 1. It illustrates the trade-o faced by parents when they want to have a child 32 Similarly, in a three-generation setting, Cox and Stark (1996) were the rst ones to mention the "demonstration eect", where the parent takes good care of his own parents hoping that his own children who live with their grand-parents will do the same when time comes that he will retire. 27 migrate. Formal education is a source of higher revenue but also of child emancipation.
The main concern for the parents is to ensure that, once away from the village, their child will have the right incentives to remit. From this perspective, religious education is the best as it instills family values. Empirically, the income loss due to the lack of formal schooling is only of second order. 33
Results on migration decision
We ran probit models of the decision to have a child migrate by caste status testing dierent specications. Results are displayed in Table 5 .
Throughout all specications and sub-samples, we found that older sons have a higher probability of migrating but their birth order and the patriarch's age have no signicant impact. Running two separate regressions depending on whether the family belongs to the ruling caste, we found that both groups have dierent migration strategies. For the ruling caste, the patriarch's earlier migration impacts signicantly and positively the probability of the son migrating, while the patriarch's longer Koranic studies decreases signicantly the probability of his son migrating. The rst result suggests that the migration of the patriarch may have permitted the accumulation of physical capital, which could have favored the son's migration. Concerning the second result on the patriarch's Koranic studies, all religious leaders belong to the ruling caste, so their sons will also pursue longer Koranic studies than the rest, which can delay their labor migration.
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Most importantly, we found that while a higher formal school level signicantly increases the probability of migrating for the low caste, it is the reverse for the ruling caste: sons from the ruling caste without formal education have a higher probability of migrating. Hence, the regressions' results are consistent with the model predictions of Proposition 2. Ruling caste parents plan the migration of religiously educated sons, while those from lower castes plan the migration of formally educated sons instead. Pooling the data over the whole sample in columns (5) and (6), the contradictory impacts of formal 33 These results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls such as the son's birth order, the patriarch's household size, the number of adult brothers abroad, and a wealth index based on the patriarch's inherited wealth. Those controls were removed however to favor a more parsimonious model better suited given the small sample size.
34 Or possibly they will not migrate but instead dedicate to a Koranic master's career in their own village. Notes: Marginal eects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses (* signicant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%). Villages dummies are included, but not displayed.
29
schooling on migration cancel each other out: it becomes not signicant on the probability of migrating. Nor is there an eect of the caste of the family, which reects the fact that both types of parents nd it protable to send a child abroad.
Nonetheless, these results need to be nuanced. As the theory suggests, education outcomes are endogenous to the migration decision: they are joined decisions. As a consequence, the results could be biased.
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Results from conditional logit estimations section 5.4 present an additional proof that higher formal education of ruling caste sons decreases their probability to migrate. But we will rst turn to determinants of schooling decisions in details.
Results on schooling decisions
The main focus of the paper is to study the impact of migration prospect on educational choices in the Matam region. Accordingly, dierent specications of the probit model of having attended formal school and the tobit model of formal school duration are displayed in Table 6 . The use of the tobit model is necessary to account for the high proportion of uneducated sons: 65% of adult sons have never been to a formal school.
In all three specications of the probit models, empirical results suggest that the age and birth order of the son along with the age of the father, do not have a signicant impact on either formal school attendance or number of years of formal school attended. The fact that the patriarch migrated before the son reached 7 years old has a consistently signicant positive eect on both the probability of formal school attendance and number of years attended. This can be interpreted in two ways. Either it is an income eect showing that the family could aord the opportunity cost of schooling, or it is the "brain gain" eect described earlier: while abroad, the patriarch realized the importance of formal schooling.
Concerning wealth eect, to avoid any simultaneity bias, a wealth index based on the patriarch's own bequest is introduced. It shows that wealthier families are more likely to send their children to a formal school. However, when patriarch's Koranic school years is introduced it becomes non-signicant, and it has also no signicant impact on the number of years of formal schooling.
35 We report in Appendix 7.7 estimations correcting for the endogeneity of education in the migration equation. However, the IV estimates of education outcomes are no longer signicant, which is most likely due to the poor predictive power of the instrument. in parentheses (* signicant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%). Villages dummies are included, but not displayed.
Especially interesting from the theoretical perspective, is the nding that ruling caste families are less likely than lower castes to send their children to formal school and send them fewer years. Similarly, the number of years the patriarch has studied Koran has a signicant negative impact on the probability of having attended formal school and the number of years. This is hardly surprising as the local power of the ruling caste is related to religious achievement.
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Thus, the introduction of the patriarch's Koranic studies lowers the signicance of the ruling caste dummy: when both are introduced, the sign of the ruling caste dummy is still negative but it becomes marginally non signicant (i.e., it is almost signicant at the 10% level) for the probability of having attended formal school, while it remains signicant but of lower impact for the number of years of formal schooling.
These results are consistent with those oered in Proposition 2. However, we could Recall from the descriptive statistics that migrant sons of the ruling caste are signicatively less likely to attend formal school compared to their lower caste counterparts and, when they do, their years of formal schooling are also signicatively fewer than those 36 Indeed, there is a very high correlation between both variables in our data. As we saw in Table 1, patriarchs from the ruling caste remained in Koranic school three years more than patriarchs from other castes and this dierence is signicant at the 5% level.
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of sons of lower castes (see Table 3 ). Yet in the initial sample of both migrants and non-migrants, the dierence in formal schooling outcomes is not statistically signicant between sons of both castes (see Table 2 ). This important result highlights the deliberate strategy of the ruling caste parents; they tend to choose not to send their prospective migrant sons to a formal school, but they are as likely as lower caste parents to send their non migrant sons to one.
The following section shows the robustness of these results controlling for unobserved family heterogeneity.
Who migrates within families?
In Table 7 we estimate the determinants of the migration decisions in the family. Are formally educated sons within families from the ruling elite less likely to migrate?
The proper way to model this is to use conditional logit models, i.e., using family xed eects. A caveat of the conditional logit is that all observations with the same outcome for the dependent variable are excluded from the estimation. For this reason our already small sample size fall dramatically by about 50% of the original size to 128 (instead of the original 207 sons from the ruling elite). Similarly, no family invariant variable can be introduced in the model specication.
Despite these limitations, these regressions give credit to our hypothesis: without additional controls, the impact of having attended formal school is negative and signicant at the 10% level. In other words, patriarchs from the ruling caste tend to send in priority their uneducated son abroad. Introducing the age and birth order of the son along with a dummy to control whether the patriarch had already migrated when the son was 7 years old, does not aect the sign. However, the signicance level of having attended formal school raises to the marginally signicant level of 12.5%. The small sample size explains this lower signicance result compared to the full sample. All the more, the families who perfectly t our model were dropped from the estimation sample (e.g., all
ruling caste families who send only uneducated sons abroad and all low caste who send only educated sons). As a consequence, this tends to reduce the impact of schooling variables on migration decisions, which reects in our estimation in marginally signicant parameters. The ruling caste (N=128)
The low caste (N=152) This study gives additional support in favor of getting rid of an obsolete caste mentality in such a context. It is an additional barrier to the formal education of high caste children. Migration can play an eective role in local development through the return of skilled migrants. Yet in our context, not only the best educated low caste sons will contribute to the "brain drain" aecting the potential development of the region, but also the ruling caste prevents the achievement of universal primary education. Examining this mechanism closely reveals that the absence of a developed social security system (e.g., a reliable pension system) hinders development. It is indeed the need of the ruling elite to rely on their sons which impedes parents to send them to a formal school.
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Proof of Proposition 1
We rst study, for caste i = h, l, the parents' incentive to save for their migrant child.
They have, depending on e ∈ {0, 1}, the following utility with respect to saving ratio α:
Both terms in equation (4) s i (1 − r) compared to r. We deduce that parents from caste i = h, l with children with education e ∈ {0, 1} are saving at rate
Combining Lemma 1 with equation (5) To prove it, let us start with the case r ≥ r i (e) where r i (e) is dened by equation (3).
This inequality is equivalent to s i ≤ s m (e). By virtue of Proposition 1, the children from caste i = l, h with education e = 0, 1 will not return. As a result, they will remit the 37 minimum r. The parents have the following expected utility depending on whether they have their child with education e = 0, 1 migrate, m = 1 or not, m = 0:
We deduce from equation (6) that the parents from caste i choose to have their child with education e migrate if and only if w m (e)r > F .
Next, we turn to r < r i (e) which implies s i > s m (e). By virtue of Proposition 1, the child will then return and remit the maximum, so that the parents' utility is:
We deduce that it is optimal for the parents from caste i = h, l to have their child with education e = 0, 1 migrate if and only if r i (e)w m (e) > F . Since r > r i (e), whenever
, we deduce that m = 1 whenever F ≤ max{r, r i (e)}w m (e), which completes the proof of Lemma 2.
By assumption A2, w m (1)r > w m (0)r, so that the migration condition is easier to meet for formally educated children. We deduce that each type of parents, i = h, l, might nd protable to have a child migrate if the following condition holds:
The interpretation of this condition is that, when the level of the xed migration cost is not too large compared to the minimum remittance, it is always worthwhile to have a child migrate, even if he should never return. To simplify the exposition in the main text we simply set F = 0 and assume that one child migrates per family. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
We study education decision by parents from caste i = h, l. Let r i (e) be dened by that the education levels of the low caste are on average higher than the ruling caste for any destinations, the t-tests being however signicant for the other African destination only.
The fact that the ruling caste migrants in the Other African destinations have much lower education levels that all the rest could make us believe that they represent an unusual sample, who drive the results. Table 9 shows us that except for education levels, the prole of ruling caste migrants in other African countries are identical to all ruling caste migrants as far as observables are concerned.
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One exception being the number of migrant's children who live with the patriarch: they have signicantly fewer children residing with the patriarch. This might reect an "exchange motive" (or a "demonstration eect") or between the low and ruling castes (* signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%). even a "hostage strategy" developed by the parents of educated children who are sent further away. The analysis indeed shows that having children leaving with the patriarch increases the likelihood of remittances. It helps counteracting the disincentive to remit of a higher education. This suggests that the two instruments "formal education" and "keeping the migrant children in the village" are complement for the parents. Anyways, since it matters for the remittance decision, we control for the number of children left behind as this variable is included in the remitting regression.
Instrumenting schooling in the migration equation
Potential candidates for instruments for schooling are very few. The supply in education is the rst thing that comes to mind, as possibly correlated with school attendance rate and uncorrelated with migration rate, except via schooling. In the six villages surveyed, a rst (formal) primary school opened between 1961 and 1998. Obviously, if a primary school opens nearby after you completed primary school it will not have any impact on your schooling. After testing various ages at which a rst primary school opening in the village induce higher school attendance, we found that school opening before birth yields greater signicance level for the impact on schooling decision.
Hence, column (* signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%). a probit model with a discrete endogenous regressor is the seemingly unrelated (SUR) biprobit model. As a benchmark, we also run an "ivprobit" which handles probit models with endogenous regressors, and a 2SLS considering both dichotomous migration and schooling decisions as continuous variables (e.g., using a linear probability model). All the results are displayed in Table 11 .
For all estimation procedures, the impact of the instrumented schooling variable is negative but no longer signicant. This could indicate that once instrumented education does not aect migration anymore. Still, this result is consistent with the Proposition 2 derived from our model: parents from the ruling caste do not seem to send their future migrant sons to formal school. Nevertheless, this result could simply be a consequence of the poor predictive power of the instrument for schooling. The absence of other instruments prevents from being able to test the validity of the instrument. The problem we are facing seems to be that IV estimation are less precise.
Nevertheless, taking advantage of the fact that most patriarchs have various adult 42 
Age ( Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses * signicant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. while results of bivariate probit for the migration equation is shown in column (3), using school opening before birth as instrument. (* signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%).
sons each can help us get around the endogeneity issue and provide more robust results.
Results of conditional logit are shown in section 5.4.
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